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21. Introduction
Financial market participants have a particular taste for locutions that
describe the dynamics of asset prices. In 2011, when sovereign spreads
for European peripheral countries successively soared, bond market par-
ticipants asserted the presence of a cliff risk, the point at which a small
shift in a bond’s value can have a big impact on its price.1 A similar
pattern was emphasized by policymakers (with different terminology) when
they complained about growing mistrust on the part of investors, a fact
that drove self-reinforcing dynamics.2 A way to picture these comments
is to say that sovereign risk pricing is regime-dependent and subject to
threshold effects. It is clear from Fig. 1, which plots spreads between 10-year
peripheral and German sovereign bonds, that the trend breaks after 2010,
a break that is hard to reconcile with the gradual deterioration of economic
conditions.3
1 See for example ”Bond investors fear cliff risks.”, Financial Times, November 7, 2011.
2 ”The Greek financial crisis: From Grexit to Grecovery”, Speech by Mr George A
Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, for the Golden Series lecture at the Of-
ficial Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), London, 7 February 2014.
3 In Spain, for example, the public debt amounted to less than 60% of GDP even by end-
2009. The Italian primary budget surplus implied that if interest rates had stayed low, only
modest fiscal adjustment would have been necessary to service the debt. Unemployment
and the trade deficit had been increasing gradually. And Ireland’s trade balance had been
improving at the time of the crisis.
3There is an extensive body of research examining sovereign bond prices
in the context of the Euro crisis, and we have learned several important
lessons. First, the massive holding of peripheral sovereign bonds by the
European banking sector created a dangerous nexus between sovereigns
and banks. It made banks’ balance sheets sensitive to sovereign shocks, and
this in turn increased pressures on sovereigns, because they were expected
to bail out the banks. These feedback loops have been put forward by
Gennaioli et al. (2010), Huizinga and Demirguc-Kunt (2010), Acharya
and Steffen (2013), Acharya et al. (2014) and Coimbra (2014), Gaballo
and Zetlin-Jones (2016). Second, there have been liquidity spirals such
as the sell-off in Irish bonds in November 2010, driven by an attempt by
market participants to regain liquidity after being unable to meet collateral
requirements.4 Liquidity conditions in the euro-area did not recover after
the sub-prime crisis, with a clear drop in liquidity after 2011. But so far,
however, we do not know the details: it is unclear by how much these two
effects, the sovereign-bank nexus and the liquidity spirals, have affected the
peripheral sovereign bond markets and if one effect has dominated.
The last lesson we have learned: previous empirical work documents a
regime switch in the spread determination model for euro-area peripheral
sovereigns during the crisis. Two different regimes have been described,
a crisis and a non-crisis regime, with a higher sensitivity of yields to
fundamentals in the crisis regime (Aizenman et al. (2013), Costantini et al.
4 ”Irish bond yields leap after selling wave”, Financial Times, 10 November 2010.
4(2014), Afonso et al. (2015)). But this work does not tell us what drove the
change in regime.
In this paper, we integrate these different pieces by exploring the possibility
that the switch to the crisis regime was triggered by the deterioration of
the banks’ risk, the liquidity spirals, or both: two endogenous mechanisms
potentially implying self-amplifying dynamics. We also control for alterna-
tive mechanisms, such as the rise of systemic risk in the market and the
rise of volatility on several market segments.5
These questions require testing for regime-switching dynamics in bond
spread determination and investigating the triggers. To do so, we use the
smooth transition regression model extended in panel by Gonza´lez et al.
(2005). Contrary to the alternative family of nonlinear models employed in
previous works, the STR model offers a parametric solution to account for
nonlinearity by allowing the parameters to change smoothly as a function of
an observable variable. We exploit this advantage by taking an off-the-shelf
model estimating the impact of economic fundamentals on the spreads of
sovereign bonds. We allow the coefficients to change as a function of several
measures of risk that might induce regime change. Linearity tests establish
a ranking among those hypothetical drivers of regime switch following
Gonza´lez et al. (2005). We compute our own indicators of risk in the banking
sector and of liquidity risk in the euro area by decomposing indicators of
5 We thank an anonymous referee for this valuable suggestion.
5systemic risk recently designed by Federal Reserve and European Central
Bank researchers (Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Hollo et al. (2012)).
In order to work on a homogeneous sample of countries, we focus on
the five peripheral member countries which have faced most financial stress
during the crisis: Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece. We start the
estimation in 2006 to examine the transition from the non-crisis to the crisis
regime and stop right before the spreads decline drastically in July 2012 to
document the dynamics specific to the crisis period. We then investigate the
reversion mechanisms by extending our period of estimation until March
2014.6
A preview of our results is the following. First, sovereign yield spreads
became more sensitive to fundamentals between 2010 and 2012; inter-
estingly we do not confirm the finding of Aizenman et al. (2013) and
Afonso et al. (2015) of an extra premium on fiscal imbalances for Italy,
Spain and Portugal. In these countries, we find that an extra premium
was instead attached to a deterioration of domestic competitiveness on the
one hand and of rising uncertainty and risk aversion in global financial
markets on the other hand. Second, the bank-sovereign nexus is the leading
driver of nonlinearities, well beyond liquidity spirals and systemic risk.
The deterioration of banks’ credit risk changed the way investors price
risk of the sovereigns. It exacerbated the effect of initial shocks to the
6 Again, we thank the referee for this suggestion.
6fundamentals. We find that the threshold value of bank credit risk that
triggers amplification effects is relatively low. Last, we find that the spreads
switched back to the non-crisis determination regime during the year
following ECB President Mario Draghi’s speech in July 2012. In that
speech, he asserted the lender-of-last-resort role of the ECB, saying it would
do ”whatever it takes” to safeguard the monetary union.
Our work complements earlier research on sovereign credit risk during
the euro crisis (Attinasi et al. (2009), Dieckman and Planck (2012), Ang
and Longstaff (2013), Acharya et al. (2014), Avino and Cotter (2014)).
Technically our work imposes fewer constraints than previous work on the
functional form of nonlinearities and allows parameters to change smoothly
as a function of an observable variable. The innovations here are therefore
the identification of the amplification mechanisms; pinpointing the bank-
sovereign nexus working through aggregate credit risk for financial names;
quantifying the resulting change in the relative weight of the determinants;
and documenting the reversion process after the crisis. More generally,
documenting nonlinear dynamics in asset pricing during a crisis episode
should contribute to a better understanding of drivers of financial instability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
abundant literature on sovereign bond pricing during the euro-crisis in order
to specify our contribution. Section 3 introduces the PSTR specification
7methodology. Section 4 summarizes our data-set, and Section 5 discusses
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Sovereign risk pricing: what have we learned?
Substantial research has examined the sovereign bond price in the context of
the euro crisis. On the one hand, there is a consensus that a sovereign-bank
nexus generated feedback loops in the dynamics of government bond spreads
during the crisis: the deterioration of the sovereign’s creditworthiness fed
back onto the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and
existing bond holdings and increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign
shocks. On the other hand, bank risk affects the sovereigns, which are
expected to bail out systemically important institutions. That represents a
significant risk given the size of banks compared to the size of the public
backstop (Acharya et al. (2014)). A theoretical paper suggestive for our
empirical investigation is by Coimbra (2014), who shows how the initial
shock is exacerbated and feeds back to credit conditions. After a rise in
sovereign risk, the banks’ VaR constraint binds, which reduces their demand
for sovereign bonds, thereby raising the sovereign risk premium. This in
turn leads to adverse sovereign debt dynamics, which raise sovereign risk.
Attinasi et al. (2009) empirically confirm the effect of the bank-sovereign
nexus in a model of government bond yield spreads (over Germany) of 10
European countries. They find that government bond yield spreads are sig-
8nificantly affected by the announcements of bank rescue packages in addition
to standard measures of government creditworthiness. Acharya and Steffen
(2013) find that credit default swap (CDS) spreads of banks and those of
governments tend to move more closely together after the announcement
of financial sector bailouts.7 But these papers assume a linear relationship
between bank credit risk and government yield. We find it more realistic
to relax the linearity assumption to account for self-reinforcing dynamics in
the feedback loop.
Liquidity spirals during the euro crisis may have amplified the effect of
initial shocks. More precisely, liquidity spirals occur when an initial shock
on sovereign bonds degrades the quality of collateral. This forces banks to
sell off bonds to regain liquidity or restore their capital ratio, reinforcing
the initial downgrading. In addition to the example of the Irish bond sell-off
mentioned in the introduction, we have the spiral on the Italian sovereign
bond market documented by Pelizzon et al. (2015). They find threshold
effects in the dynamic relationship between changes in Italian sovereign
credit risk and liquidity: there is a structural change in this relationship
above 500 basis points (bp) in the sovereign Italian CDS spread, because
7 Several papers have focused on the opposite direction of the feedback loop: Acharya and
Steffen (2013) find that the Eurozone banks actively engaged in a ’carry trade’ in the crisis
period, increasing their exposure to risky sovereign debt. Gennaioli et al. (2010) argue that
the sovereign risk affects the banks through their exposure to sovereign bonds. Huizinga
and Demirguc-Kunt (2010) provide evidence in a large cross-country sample that bank
CDS spreads responded negatively to the deterioration of government finances in 2007-08.
9of changes in collateral and margins for Italian bonds. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) have theoretically modeled liquidity spirals: 8 debt pricing
becomes more “information sensitive” and safe assets become less safe,
so investors are more selective about the quality of assets they accept as
collateral. Their demand for the sovereign bonds that are perceived to
be more risky declines, thereby raising the sovereign risk premium. So
there is a liquidity spiral: a falling sovereign bond market leads financial
intermediaries to fly to liquidity, and this amplifies the effects of the initial
price reduction. Relatively small shocks can cause liquidity suddenly to dry
up, leading to a major correction of asset prices.
We have learned, therefore, that banking credit risk and liquidity dete-
rioration affected sovereign credit risk during the euro crisis. In addition,
theoretical models point to endogenous amplification effects. Consequently,
handling these variables as extra regressors in the sovereign risk-pricing
model is misleading. Our work tests the hypotheses that the deterioration
of banking risk and liquidity shocks have had self-reinforcing effects on
sovereign pricing. Before proceeding, we conclude the literature review by
examining existing evidence of nonlinearities in the Euro-area sovereign
bond spread.
8 Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) initially pointed out this
externality.
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Several empirical papers find a regime switch in the spread determination
model for euro-area peripheral sovereigns during the crisis (Gerlach et al.
(2010), Borgy et al. (2011), Favero and Missale (2012), Montfort and
Renne (2014), Aizenman et al. (2013), Costantini et al. (2014), Afonso
et al. (2015)). But these papers are silent on what triggered these changes.
We go beyond them by testing two channels that may have changed the
relative influence of variables determining spreads and thereby triggered
the amplification mechanism we describe. Our empirical strategy allows the
estimated coefficient of the spread determinants to change as a function of
an observable variable.
3. Empirical strategy
Previous work neither explains nor quantifies the mechanism driving the
regime change in the sovereign bond pricing. We use a smooth transition
regression model (STR), in order to model the transition process with an ob-
servable variable. The PSTR model can be thought of as a regime-switching
model that allows a continuum of regimes bounded by two extreme regimes
(Fouquau et al. (2008)). Each intermediate regime is characterized by a
different value of the threshold variable and the shape of the transition
function. We compare the effect of different potential channels of amplifica-
tion. With linearity tests we identify the predominant driver of regime shift.
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We quantify this shift by estimating the coefficients in both extreme regimes
To model the regime switching and provide an economic interpretation,
we use a parametric specification. More precisely, we employ a panel smooth
transition regression (PSTR) model developed by Gonza´lez et al. (2005). The
choice of panel data is motivated by the low temporal dimension of macroe-
conomic data. The PSTR model allows us to characterize nonlinearity as a
function of an observable variable. The sovereign spread Sit is estimated as
follows:
Sit = µi + β
′
1Xit + β
′
2Xitg(qit; γ, c) + uit (1)
for countries i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T . Here µi represents individual
fixed effects, Xit is a set of variables that capture credit risk, liquidity risk
and international risk aversion, γ the smooth parameter, c the location pa-
rameter defined below, and uit are i.i.d. errors. The transition function g(.) is
continuous and bounded between 0 and 1. This specification requires making
an assumption on the functional form of g(.). Gonza´lez et al. (2005) design
their empirical framework with a logistic function of order 1 or 2. We use a
logistic function of order 1 that has an S shape and is used in most empirical
12
work:9
g(qit; γ, c) =
1
1 + exp [−γ(qit − c)]
, γ > 0. (2)
where qit is the observable threshold variable. The parameter γ determines
the smoothness, i.e., the speed at which the vector of coefficients goes
from β′1 to β
′
1 + β
′
2; the higher the value of the parameter, the faster the
transition. The location parameter c shows the inflection point of the
transition, i.e. the threshold value at which the regime shifts. Thus, the
regime switching depends not only on the choice of the transition form but
also on the estimated parameters. In order to get an accurate grasp of the
pricing evolution during the crisis period, we will plot g(.), the combination
of qit, γ and c to show for every date in which regime applies, this regime
being potentially an intermediate regime.
The estimation procedure is reported in Appendix 1.
4. Data description
The estimation of the model in Eq.(1) is subject to two major data con-
straints. On the one hand, macroeconomic fundamentals have a low fre-
quency (annual, quarterly or monthly), while our financial data are daily.
9 In our estimates, the information criteria indicate that a logistic function of order 1 fits
the data better than a function of order 2. The results of table 4 with logistic of order 2
are available upon request.
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Therefore we transform all series to monthly data. 10 On the other hand, the
sovereign crisis started in late 2009, and the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) program implemented in September 2012 successfully narrowed the
spreads when it was announced in July 2012. So we have only three years
during which the hypothesized transition might have occurred. Therefore, to
obtain a sufficient number of observations, our estimation is based on a bal-
anced panel of the five peripheral Eurozone countries in which the sovereign
yield was under pressure between January 2006 and July 2012 : Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Subsequently, in order to test the robustness
of our findings, we extend our estimates up until March 2014.
4.1 Determinants of the sovereign bond spread
Our dependent variable is the long-term government bond spread, defined
as the difference between country i’s government bond yield and the
risk-free rate of the same maturity. For each country in the sample, we
use the long-term German yield as the risk-free rate for the Euro area
(Dunne et al. (2007)), and the government yield of this country at the
same maturity as the German yields. We use daily observations of 10-year
bond yields provided by Bloomberg, from which we compute a monthly
10 We calculate the monthly average of the daily series and we transform quarterly to
monthly using a local quadratic transformation with the average matched to the source
data. We used Eviews software for this transformation.
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average.11 The descriptive statistics of our variables are presented in Table 1.
A key choice is the set of explanatory variables included in Xt in Eq
(1). The government bond yield spread represents the risk premium paid
by governments relative to the benchmark government bond12. From a
theoretical perspective, these instruments can be priced by decomposing the
risk premium into credit risk and liquidity risk.13 Credit risk is influenced by
variables that affect the sustainability of the debt and the ability and will-
ingness to repay. For a sovereign entity, these are macroeconomic variables
determining internal and external balances, i.e. the budget deficit and the
current account. The empirical evidence in the euro area context suggests
that significant determinants include fiscal variables, activity-related and
competitiveness-related variables (see Attinasi et al. (2009), Haugh et al.
(2009), De Grauwe and Ji (2013)). Liquidity risk is related to the size of
the issuer, with an expected negative relationship due to larger transaction
costs in small markets. In contrast with findings on credit risk, empirical
evidence is mixed about the pricing of a liquidity premium in the sovereign
11 For Ireland only 8-year bond yields are available, so we computed the spread using the
8-year German yield.
12 Early and influential empirical papers include Edwards (1986), Eichengreen and Portes
(1989), Cantor and Packer (1996).
13 For countries in the euro area, most of government bonds are held by euro-area in-
vestors, so we can ignore foreign exchange risk. Recall also that our spread variable is the
spread over the euro-denominated Bund.
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bond spread.14 Beyond these two theoretical risk premia, Longstaff et al.
(2011) find that a large component of sovereign credit risk is linked to global
factors, while Ang and Longstaff (2013) find that the systemic default risk
of European countries is highly correlated with financial market variables.
In total, we draw on the previous research mentioned above to test a large
range of macroeconomic and financial determinants.
To capture fiscal factors, we include the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal
balance from Eurostat. The expected signs are positive for debt-to GDP
and negative for fiscal balance because a deterioration of fiscal sustainability
increases the sovereign risk; we add the squared value of the debt-to-GDP
ratio to capture non-linear dynamics due to threshold effects of sovereign
debt on real growth. These fiscal data are revised data, necessary because
of the presence of Greece in the sample, although these are not the data
initially observed by market participants. Other relevant variables are
economic activity and the country’s competitiveness. We proxy economic
activity with four variables: unemployment has an expected positive
sign; the manufacturing production index, the new housing permits from
Eurostat and the industrial production index from IFS are all expected
to reduce the spread when they increase. The country’s competitiveness is
14 For example, Geyer et al. (2004) find that liquidity plays a minor role for the pricing
of EMU government yield spreads. Favero et al. (2010) find that investors value liquidity,
but they value it less when risk increases.
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proxied with the real effective exchange rate defined as the relative price
of domestic to foreign consumer price index from IFS. An increase is an
appreciation, hence a deterioration of competitiveness, implying that the
expected coefficient is positive. In addition we use the trade balance from
Eurostat, which is expected to have a negative coefficient.15 Second, we
include a variable for liquidity risk, proxied by the bid-ask spread measured
in the bond yields from Bloomberg; it is expected to have a positive
coefficient, because an increase of the bid-ask spread is a deterioration
of liquidity. Because the liquidity effects were mixed in previous studies,
we also use the country’s share of total outstanding Euro-denominated
long-term government securities issued in the Euro zone, from ECB, and
expected to have a negative coefficient. We include the CBOE Volatility
Index (VIX) from Bloomberg as a measure of international risk aversion,
because it is often considered to be the world’s premier barometer of
investor sentiment and market volatility (e.g., Rey (2013)). The coefficient
is expected to be positive.
Last, we control for the effect of non-standard monetary measures adopted
by the ECB during the crisis. In May 2010, the ECB decided to start the
Securities Markets Programme (SMP) with large securities purchases in or-
15 All data are available at a quarterly frequency, except for unemployment and real
exchange rate (monthly) and fiscal deficit (annual).
17
der to address tensions in certain market segments.16 We use the amount
of securities held for monetary purposes (divided by 100), reported in the
ECB’s weekly financial statements.17
4.2 Endogenous drivers of nonlinearities, two hypotheses
We use a set of financial data to capture our two hypotheses: bank-sovereign
nexus and liquidity spirals. They represent the set of threshold variables
that we will include alternatively in our nonlinear estimations. They are
composed of indicators of uncertainty and stress in the banking sector and
liquidity risk. In addition to including usual well-known measures of such
risk, we decompose the indicator of systemic risk designed by the Kansas
City Fed which aggregates risk of different market segments, and we re-
calculate the individual components measuring banking and liquidity risk
with European data (Hakkio and Keeton (2009)). This allows us to obtain
twenty-two measures tested in alternative specifications to obtain robust
findings. All threshold variables are described in Appendix 2 Table 8.
16 The SMP was terminated in September 2012 in favor of Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMTs) in sovereign secondary bond markets.
17 The ECB provided in December 2011 and March 2012 more than 1 trillion Euros of
additional liquidity to the financial system with the very long-term refinancing operations
(LTRO). Unfortunately publicly available data are not broken down by country so they
are not relevant in our panel estimates.
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5. Estimation results
5.1 The changing composition of the yield spreads over time
In order to test the linearity assumption and select the optimal threshold
variable, we need a single specification for the whole set of threshold
variables. Selecting explanatory variables by linear models might not be ap-
propriate, since some variables could be important in a nonlinear way.18 So
we select the common specification using a time-varying PSTR (TV-PSTR)
which allows the coefficients to vary with time. It has both advantages of
allowing non-linearity and not imposing a particular observable threshold
variable. To proceed, we estimate a TV-PSTR on alternative specifications
and select the optimal specification according to information criteria.19
The linearity test results reported at the bottom of Table 2 lead to a
strong rejection of the null hypothesis of a linear relationship (estimated
LM statistics go from 207 to 227 across the different specifications and
p− values are inferior to 1%). It is, therefore, clear that linear models of
sovereign spreads are misspecified during this period of estimation. Our
specifications yield similar slope parameters (γ is estimated between 0.07
to 0.22), the same inflection date (c = 72 corresponds to December 2011
18 We thank the anonymous referee for this comment.
19 We test the largest possible vector of determinants by simultaneously including several
proxies of the same effect (for example we include the real exchange rate and the trade
balance together). The only exception is the four alternative proxies for economic activity
because of their strong correlation.
19
when the LTRO operation was launched) and consistent estimated values
and signs across different specifications.
Figure 3 which plots the estimated transition function indicates that
investors have priced sovereign risk differently during the crisis, and the
transition from the non-crisis to the crisis regime has taken two years.
The information criterion suggests that the second specification including
the manufacturing production index is optimal (Schwarz = -0.65). In
the following we focus on this specification to comment on the changing
composition of the spread determinants over time.
First, investors price fiscal risk, throughout the period under examina-
tion, through the debt-to-GDP ratio and the fiscal balance. In the crisis
regime, however, they penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly, attaching
an extra premium on the stock of debt (βˆ2 = 0.66) and the fiscal balance
(βˆ2 = −1.65).
20 Before the crisis the effect of competitiveness was ambigu-
ous because of the unexpected positive sign of the estimated coefficient.
Since the crisis however, the relationship has become unambiguous: the
sign is negative implying that the deterioration of the trade balance is
now associated with a higher yield (βˆ2 = −47.51). Since the crisis, yield
spreads increase as a response to a slowdown in economic activity, proxied
by the manufacturing production index (βˆ2 = −0.39). The international
20 The increase is attenuated by the negative coefficient of squared debt βˆ2 = −0.002. The
aggregate sign is, however positive.
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risk aversion is statistically significant in explaining spreads before the
crisis, but its role becomes critical during the crisis when the relationship
between the two variables is multiplied by 5. Liquidity becomes significant
only during the crisis, as a higher bid-ask spread is associated with a higher
yield spread only during the crisis (βˆ2 = 5.56).
21 Last, as expected, the
yield spreads decrease as a response to the OMT program during the crisis.
Overall, we confirm a key finding of previous work: the change of the
fundamentals is not sufficient to explain yields over the crisis period, and
an increase in the sensitivity to fundamentals and the pricing of new risks
are also relevant (Aizenman et al. (2013) and Afonso et al. (2015)). So far
we have allowed the coefficients to vary over time, but we argue that the
regime shift may be endogenous due to self-reinforcing dynamics. What
are the drivers of regime shift? In the following, we answer by relaxing
the linearity assumption again and we allow the coefficients to vary with
the different observable variables that capture the bank-sovereign nexus,
liquidity risk, and the controls.
5.2 The prominent role of the bank-sovereign nexus
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that the null hypothesis of a linear
relationship is strongly rejected regardless of which threshold variable
21 This effect is confirmed in two out of four specifications reported in Table 2
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is included in the specification. As mentioned by van Dijk et al. (2002)
and Gonza´lez et al. (2005), the linearity test can be used to test the null
hypothesis of a linear or homogeneous relationship when the threshold
variable is known. However, when this variable is theoretically unknown,
the linearity test allows to select the best threshold variable among a set
of candidate variables. More precisely, Gonza´lez et al. (2005, p.6) indicate
that “the test is carried out for a set of candidate transition variables and
the variable that gives rise to the strongest rejection of linearity (if any) is
chosen as the transition variable”.
In Table 3, the ranking of the test statistics reveals that four out of
the five proxies of the bank-sovereign nexus rank in the top five highest
rejection statistics: CDS Snr-Fin, CDS Sub-Fin, IVolBank and Cmaxi Fi
reject linearity with 210.8, 177.2, 144.8 and 140.6 respectively. Only one
indicator of liquidity risk ranks in the top five : Aaa/10-year Bund spread
gets a rejection statistic of 147.3, while the five alternatives get a significant
lower statistics mostly below 100. Similarly, the remaining candidate in the
set of threshold variables get much lower rejection statistics (for example,
CISS, the indicator of systemic risk, gets a rejection statistics of 79.7,
almost three times lower than the banking CDS index).
We find, therefore, that investors are sensitive to the risk in the banking
sector, and this triggers nonlinear dynamics. While the bank-sovereign loop
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has been documented before, we are the first to give a functional form
to the subsequent amplification effects in the government bond pricing.
More precisely, the pricing model is a nonlinear function of fundamentals,
where the weight of these fundamentals varies with the risk of banks. The
deterioration of market conditions for banks changes the way investors price
risk of the sovereigns. We examine the evolution of the estimated coefficient
below.
Given the high rejection statistics obtained in every model, we check the
robustness of our selection choice using BIC information criteria. While the
model with the banking CDS index rejects linearity with the highest statis-
tics, the BIC criterion indicates that the model with the banking stress
indicator Cmax Fi is more efficient (Table 4). So in the last step of our
empirical investigation, we estimate the two specifications to examine the
variation of coefficient loads.
5.3 Heteroegeneity in the sample
The threshold variable Cmax Fi has an individual dimension (i.e. it takes
different values across countries, see Fig. 2) contrary to the homogeneous
CDS Snr-Fin, a feature allowing us to spot heterogeneity in our sample and
suggesting two different dynamics across countries. Indeed, the threshold
value of Cmax Fi that triggers the regime shift, c = 0.86, was never crossed
in Italy, Spain and Portugal, while Ireland and Greece went from the first
23
to the second regime (Fig. 2). Therefore, our estimates suggest that their
spreads have different dynamics. Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Johnson (2014)
point out similar heterogeneous dynamics in the sovereign CDS of the
five stressed countries. This finding leads us to split our sample into two
sub-samples, one including Italy, Spain and Portugal, the other Greece
and Ireland. The smaller sub-sample still has 162 observations, which is
sufficient for reasonably precise and stable estimates.
We re-estimate the model in each sub-sample (Tables 5 and 6). We obtain
a parsimonious specification by adopting a general-to-specific modeling
approach, where we eliminate variables based on their statistical significance
and the Schwartz information criterion.
5.3.1 Italy, Portugal and Spain
Results in Table 5 report the transition speed, γ, the location parameter c
and the estimated coefficients in regime 1 and regime 2 (βˆ1 and βˆ1 + βˆ2)
in two estimations, one using the optimal threshold variable, CDS Snr-Fin
and the other using Cmax Fi for robustness check. We comment only on the
first estimate. The transition from the first to the second regime is sharp
(γ = 95.4) and the threshold value, c is 130.7 bp. Our model predicts that
investors price the sovereign risk differently when the banking CDS index
is over 130.7 bp, a value which was crossed in autumn 2010 shortly after
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the Greek crisis broke. When we focus on the crisis period, the transition
is sharp, which may illustrate the sudden contagion effects. The plot of a
sharp transition function does not carry much information, so we focus
instead on the numerical evolution of the coefficients.
Estimates confirm the time-varying PSTR result of an increase in the
sensitivity to fundamentals. Investors apply an extra premium to compet-
itiveness and international risk aversion (βˆ2 = 0.03 for real exchange rate
and βˆ2 = 0.03 for the VIX). In turn, the extra premium on fiscal imbalances
uncovered in the large sample is much less pronounced in this sub-sample:
when we plot the evolution of the weight, we observe that the increase is
very limited.22 In sum, the market discipline effect works through a higher
sensitivity to the countries’ perceived competitiveness rather than the fiscal
situation. Last, the SMP program does not have the expected negative effect
on the yield spread.
5.3.2 Greece and Ireland
The results of the second sub-sample including Greece and Ireland reported
in Table 6 also indicate that the yield spreads have become more sensitive
to fundamentals since 2010. Figure 4 plots the smooth transition to the
crisis regime. The fact that the transition is smooth and not sharp in this
sample may be due to the presence of Greece, the epicenter of the crisis
22 The graph is available upon request.
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from which contagion effects then spread.
Contrary to the previous sample, we find that an extra premium is applied
to fiscal imbalances: the coefficient of debt-to-GDP increases in the second
regime as well as the absolute value of the coefficient of fiscal balance
(βˆ2 6= 0). So the higher sensitivity to fiscal imbalances seen in the larger
sample was driven by the presence of Greece and Ireland, two counties
that have faced fiscal deterioration to a much larger extent than Italy,
Spain and Portugal. In addition, a higher sensitivity is detected for
competitiveness (the real effective exchange rate and trade balance have
both a higher absolute coefficient in the second regime) and economic
activity (manufacturing production index). We do not detect a significant
effect of the SMP program in this sub-sample either.
In total, splitting the sample highlights that an extra premium on fiscal
deterioration is applied in Greece and Ireland only. Robustness tests are
reported in Appendix 3.
5.4 Dynamics after Draghi’s speech and macro-prudential implications
Our objective in this paper was to shed light on the regime shift during the
crisis. We start the estimation in 2006 to examine the transition towards
the crisis regime and stop right before the spreads decline drastically in July
2012. It is interesting, however, to examine whether our model captures the
drastic decline afterwards, a sudden decline that cannot be due to the evo-
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lution of fundamentals. It may be that the ECB President’s commitment to
do ”whatever it takes” blurred market signals, so that ”spreads no longer
show us what investors think about debt sustainability” (Paris and Wyplosz
(2013)). In our analysis, that would introduce a third regime in government
yield pricing after Draghi’s speech, where the vector of determinants and
their sensitivity change again. Alternatively, one may argue that Draghi’s
speech tamed market tensions and restored the pricing regime prevailing
before the crisis. In that case, we would find that the same endogenous
mechanisms operated in reverse. To check, we extend the estimates of our
optimal specification in both sub-samples up until March 2014, the maxi-
mum date with available data.23
The takeaway is that the evolution of the coefficient load is very similar
to the previous estimation period and the same regime-shifting mechanism
operate in reverse. Indeed, Figure 5 of the new transition functions indicates
that the model shifts back progressively to the first regime after July 2012.
By the end of 2013, the shift was complete with the coefficients back to their
pre-crisis level. The financial CDS index is still a key driver of regime shift
(LM statistics is 155 and 137 in each sub-sample respectively). The fact
that it gets progressively back to its pre-crisis value drives the shift back
23 There are missing data for the Irish yield after 2012 because liquidity was scarce dur-
ing the assistance program. In order to bridge the missing data, we mix three different
maturities, the 7, 8 and 9 year maturity (the longer maturity yield data include all bonds
with lower maturity).
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to the first regime of coefficients. Our estimates, therefore, show that the
reversion to the non-crisis regime was driven by a break of the feedback loop
between the sovereign and the banks. It is interesting to observe that it oc-
curred well before macro-prudential measures were enforced to address the
fragility of the banking sector’s balance sheet, including the banking union
and the stress tests in Fall 2014. The ECB broke the sovereign-bank nexus
and interrupted the feedback loop. This bought time while macro-prudential
measures were being implemented.
6. Concluding remarks
We estimate the sovereign spread of five peripheral members of the euro area
using panel non-linear estimation methods. Our objectives were threefold:
1) test for nonlinear sovereign bond pricing 2) discriminate between two
potential drivers of non-linearity, the sovereign-bank nexus and liquidity
spirals and 3) quantify the threshold effects and coefficient regime shifts in
order to draw lessons for economic policy.
Our PSTR estimations confirm the previous finding that the changing sen-
sitivity of bond yields to fundamentals is necessary to explain yields during
the crisis period (Aizenman et al. (2013) and Afonso et al. (2015)). We find
that investors then attached an extra premium to competitiveness, interna-
tional risk, and to a lesser extent liquidity. Contrary to previous studies, we
find an extra premium on fiscal imbalances only in Greece and Ireland, not
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in Italy, Spain and Portugal. We show that the increasing risk in the bank-
ing sector was not only a significant determinant of sovereign risk, but it
also amplified the effects of movements in fundamentals. This was a key link
in the bank-sovereign nexus. Finally, we find that bond yields returned to
their pre-crisis spread determination regime during the year after Draghi’s
speech, demonstrating the power of the lender of last resort to stabilize mar-
kets. These findings of regime switch and switch back are new, revealed by
our estimation method.
There are significant lessons for European regulators and policymakers here:
1) Domestic fiscal discipline and structural reforms could not bring yields
down as long as the bank-sovereign feedback loop was not fully addressed.
2) Regime shift was better explained by risk in the banking sector than a
general systemic risk indicator. So tracking the financial CDS index would
effectively complement the macroprudential toolkit of policymakers. 3) The
individual dynamics were driven by the aggregate banking risk, a risk that
the ECB intervention has successfully tamed. So, a more speculative con-
clusion: 4) Limiting the risk-sharing of the ECB operations in the sovereign
bond markets as in the asset purchase program announced in January 2015
carries the risk of re-igniting tensions.
Beyond the specific Eurozone crisis event, our findings may contribute to a
better understanding of financial instability, with macroprudential lessons.
The financial price determination models prevailing in normal times may
be invalid during crises; the risk pricing of financial assets is fundamen-
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tally state-dependent. Our empirical framework gives a simply implementable
method to track regime changes and identify the trigger. It is key to act on
it quickly. When the risk trigger is systemic, the central bank can change the
state to restore the pricing dynamics, by virtue of its unique role as lender
of last resort.
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Tables and figures
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
Table presents the descriptive statistics of the sovereign spreads and explanatory variables.
Out. Issues: Outstanding Euro-denomneated long-term government securities issued in
the Euro-zone. Unconv Monetary: Unconventional Monetary Policy. Manuf. Prod.: Man-
ufacturing production index. Industry: Industrial production index. Hous. Permits: new
housing permits.
Spread Debt Fisc. Balance R. Eff. Exch rate VIX Bis-ask
Mean 2.678 85.591 -6.780 100.98 23.086 0.143
Median 0.870 94.626 -5.518 100.59 20.723 0.013
Maximum 29.886 174.882 3.134 115.22 62.254 5.886
Minimum -0.801 23.159 -34.081 92.95 10.787 0.001
Std. Dev. 4.686 35.237 6.477 3.456 10.624 0.539
Skewness 3.364 -0.042 -1.779 1.277 1.708 7.273
Kurtosis 16.384 2.235 8.495 6.436 6.346 64.823
Out. Issues Unconv. Monetary Manuf. Prod. Hous. Permits Industry Unemployment
Mean 0.082 64.051 105.46 205.72 105.08 11.141
Median 0.047 2.571 100.80 138.43 103.24 9.200
Maximum 0.262 283.61 132.47 907.47 140.99 25.300
Minimum 0.007 0.000 81.110 25.294 51.500 4.300
Std. Dev. 0.089 93.716 11.788 179.72 14.714 4.864
Skewness 1.244 1.275 0.588 2.028 0.060 1.024
Kurtosis 2.893 3.290 2.285 7.231 3.192 3.357
34Table 2 Selection of the optimal specification with a TVPSTR model.
Table presents estimations of TV-PSTR model on alternative specifications and the optimal specification is selected according to
information criteria. The T-statistics in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**):
significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.β1 and β2 correspond to the coefficient in Eq (11). β1 is the
coefficients in the first extreme regime . The coefficients in the second extreme regime is β1 + β2.
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2 β1 β2
Debt− to−GDP 0.137∗∗∗
(7.78)
0.353∗∗∗
(2.61)
0.034∗∗
(2.21)
0.666∗∗∗
(5.29)
0.030∗∗
(2.04)
0.645∗∗∗
(4.78)
0.021
(1.32)
0.686∗∗∗
(5.09)
Debt− to−GDP 2 −0.001∗∗∗
(-6.16)
0.000
(-0.52)
0.000
(1.44)
−0.002∗∗∗
(-3.80)
0.000∗∗∗
(2.89)
−0.002∗∗∗
(-3.48)
0.000∗∗∗
(3.24)
−0.002∗∗∗
(-3.71)
Fiscal balance 0.162∗∗∗
(4.69)
−0.845∗∗∗
(-5.10)
0.096∗∗∗
(7.13)
−1.649∗∗∗
(-9.80)
0.094∗∗∗
(6.69)
−1.992∗∗∗
(-10.3)
0.073∗∗∗
(4.26)
−2.059∗∗∗
(-10.21)
R Effect. Exch Rate 0.230∗∗∗
(9.28)
−0.395∗∗∗
(-4.22)
0.127∗∗∗
(8.46)
−0.156
(-1.19)
0.121∗∗∗
(8.65)
−0.573∗∗∗
(-6.40)
0.126∗∗∗
(8.34)
−0.615∗∗∗
(-6.02)
Trade balance 28.39∗∗∗
(6.54)
−46.93∗∗∗
(-9.84)
24.05∗∗∗
(7.94)
−47.51∗∗∗
(-8.34)
25.49∗∗∗
(7.98)
−64.05∗∗∗
(-17.05)
26.58∗∗∗
(7.73)
−60.03∗∗∗
(-13.36)
VIX 0.022∗∗∗
(5.87)
0.034
(0.98)
0.019∗∗∗
(7.17)
0.087∗∗
(2.11)
0.018∗∗∗
(7.09)
0.079
(1.61)
0.019∗∗∗
(6.93)
0.055
(1.06)
Bid-Ask 4.059∗
(1.76)
−2.491
(-0.53)
−0.505
(-0.56)
5.561∗∗∗
(2.99)
−0.106
(-0.13)
5.075∗∗∗
(2.89)
0.083
(0.1)
4.584∗∗∗
(2.62)
Outstanding issues of LT govt sec −75.76∗∗∗
(-3.49)
−12.52∗∗∗
(-2.84)
0.333
(0.02)
10.78∗∗∗
(2.46)
−8.300
(-0.58)
18.88∗∗∗
(3.63)
−2.082
(-0.15)
14.93∗∗
(2.42)
Unconventional Monetary Policy 0.017∗∗∗
(4.72)
−0.033∗∗∗
(-3.97)
0.013∗∗∗
(7.00)
−0.031∗∗∗
(-3.66)
0.012∗∗∗
(6.32)
−0.021∗∗
(-2.51)
0.012∗∗∗
(5.41)
−0.024∗∗∗
(-2.81)
Unemployement 0.054
(1.02)
0.541∗∗∗
(3.42)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
Manufacturing production index −
(-)
−
(-)
0.005
(1.1)
−0.393∗∗∗
(-3.17)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
Industry production index −
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
0.004∗
(1.67)
−0.006
(-0.21)
−
(-)
−
(-)
New housing permits −
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
−
(-)
0.001∗∗∗
(2.67)
0.031
(0.8)
Smooth Parameter γ 0.072 0.179 0.211 0.221
Loc Parameter c 72.0 72.0 72.0 72.0
Linearity Stat. 222.7∗∗∗ 227.4∗∗∗ 207.7∗∗∗ 208.2∗∗∗
RSS 153.9 139.1 149.7 148.0
Schwarz Crit. -0.549 -0.651 -0.577 -0.588
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Table 3 Linearity Tests with a PSTR model (specification 2)
The variable that gives rise to the strongest rejection of linearity is chosen as the transition
variable. The corresponding LM statistic has an asymptotic χ2(p) distribution under H0.
(*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at
the 1% level. We have used the specification 2 of the table 1.
H1: Fire-sale liquidation
H2: Bank-sovereign
loop
Control
Flight to
liquidity
Flight to
quality
Asymetry
information
AAA/ 10-year Bond spread 147.3***
10-year Swap spread 110.2*** 110.2***
A/ 10-year Treasury spread 92.10*** 92.10***
High-Yield bond/ Baa spread 77.6*** 77.6*** 77.6***
StockbondsCorr 80.4***
Cross-Section dispersion banks 63.2***
IVOL bank 144.8***
Cmax Fi 140.6***
Euribor-OIS 123.2***
CDS Snr-Fin 210.8***
CDS Sub-Fin 177.2***
I-traxx Europe 120.4***
X-over 84.10***
Hivol 79.3***
Vstoxx 63.2***
RVOL Germ 24.1***
RVOL Nonfin 78.7***
RVOL Pound 54.6***
RVOL Doll 20.3**
RVOL Yen 45.2***
FTSE 300 70.4***
S& P 350 69.6***
Domestic indices returns 26.8***
CISS 79.7***
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Table 4 Comparing two non-linear models.
Table presents the PSTR estimation for two different threshold variables, CDS Snr-Fin
and Cmax Fi. The BIC criterion indicates that the model with the banking stress indicator
Cmax Fi is more efficient. We have used the specification 2 of the table 1. (*): significant
at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.
Threshold CDS Snr-Fin Cmax Fi
Linearity Stat 210.7*** 140.6***
Smooth Parameter 0.928 549.9
Loc Parameter 259.1 0.859
RSS 238.9 145.92
Schwarz Crit. -0.110 -0.603
Table 5 Estimates of the sovereign bond model for Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Table presents the PSTR estimation for two different threshold variables, CDS Snr-Fin
and Cmax Fi. The specification 2 of the table 1 have been used. β1 and β2 correspond to
the coefficient in Eq (11). β1 is the coefficient in the first extreme regime . The coefficient
in the second extreme regime is β1 + β2. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant
at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.
CDS Snr-Fin CMax Fi
β1 β2 β1 β2
Debt− to−GDP 0.064∗∗∗
(2.56)
−0.068∗∗
(-2.48)
0.097∗∗∗
(12.26)
−0.015∗∗∗
(-4.27)
Debt− to−GDP 2 0.000
(-1.14)
0.001∗∗∗
(3.17)
−
(-)
−
(-)
Fiscal balance 0.035∗∗∗
(3.72)
0.011
(0.16)
−0.042∗∗∗
(-2.84)
0.130∗∗∗
(4.50)
Real Exchange Rate 0.044∗∗∗
(2.82)
0.034∗
(1.82)
0.050∗∗∗
(3.69)
0.060∗∗∗
(4.20)
Trade balance −
(-)
−
(-)
−7.444∗∗∗
(-3.57)
10.03∗∗∗
(4.19)
VIX 0.014∗∗∗
(6.73)
0.028∗∗∗
(3.67)
0.022∗∗∗
(7.52)
0.006
(0.96)
Bid-Ask 17.72∗∗∗
(3.62)
−13.19∗∗∗
(-2.68)
4.872∗∗∗
(7.29)
−0.119
(-0.2)
Outstanding stock −7.045
(-0.59)
−9.766∗∗∗
(-5.38)
−
(-)
−
(-)
Unconventional Monetary Policy −0.003
(-1.27)
0.014∗∗∗
(6.29)
0.004∗∗∗
(6.25)
0.007∗∗∗
(6.61)
Manufacturing prod. index −0.008∗∗
(-1.97)
−0.015
(-1.00)
0.042∗∗∗
(7.85)
−0.036∗∗∗
(-3.05)
Smooth Parameter γ 95.4 42.2
Loc Parameter c 130.7 0.530
Linearity Stat. 94.6∗∗∗ 79.7∗∗∗
RSS 21.6 18.5
Schwarz Crit. -1.843 -2.053
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Table 6 Estimates of the sovereign bond model for Greece and Ireland.
Table presents the PSTR estimation for two different threshold variables, CDS Snr-Fin
and Cmax Fi. The specification 2 of the table 1 have been used. β1 and β2 correspond to
the coefficient in Eq (11). β1 is the coefficient in the first extreme regime . The coefficient
in the second extreme regime is β1 + β2. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant
at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.
CDS Snr-Fin CMax Fi
β1 β2 β1 β2
Debt− to−GDP −0.222∗∗
(-2.39)
1.08∗∗∗
(4.02)
−0.123∗∗∗
(-4.47)
0.376∗∗∗
(5.52)
Debt− to−GDP 2 0.000
(0.90)
−0.004∗∗∗
(-2.75)
0.001∗∗∗
(6.86)
−0.001∗∗∗
(-3.49)
Fiscal balance 0.336∗∗∗
(3.74)
−0.895∗∗∗
(-4.32)
−0.088∗∗
(-2.13)
0.108∗
(1.80)
R Effect. Exch Rate −0.179∗∗
(-2.14)
1.304∗∗∗
(7.88)
0.060∗∗
(2.06)
−0.021
(-0.81)
Trade balance 44.63∗∗∗
(4.53)
−67.13∗∗∗
(-3.79)
28.51∗∗∗
(5.13)
−43.48∗∗∗
(-6.04)
VIX 0.104
(1.50)
−0.356∗∗
(-2.00)
0.016∗∗∗
(2.66)
−0.032
(-1.49)
Bid-Ask −
(-)
−
(-)
4.054∗∗∗
(10.63)
−0.657
(-1.17)
Outstanding stock −
(-)
−
(-)
−11.696
(-0.31)
−416.2∗∗∗
(-4.59)
Unconventional Monetary Policy −
(-)
−
(-)
0.029∗∗∗
(6.41)
−0.048∗∗∗
(-6.51)
Manufacturing prod. index 0.473∗∗∗
(6.12)
−1.693∗∗∗
(-6.80)
−
(-)
−
(-)
Smooth Parameter γ 0.007 438.4
Loc Parameter c 176.5 0.861
Linearity Stat. 132.6∗∗∗ 59.7∗∗∗
RSS 241.2 86.9
Schwarz Crit. 1.049 0.186
38
Figure 1. Sovereign spreads
Figure presents the evolution of sovereign spreads variable.
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Figure 2. Threshold variable Cmax Fi.
Figure presents the evolution of Cmax Fi variable. Cmaxt = 1−
Pt
max[Pt−24...Pt]
with
Pt, the domestic banking stock index. The more bearish the market, the closer to
1 the indicator.
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Figure 3. Transition function in the TVPSTR model.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Figure 4. Transition function in Greece and Ireland from 2006 to 2012
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Figure 5. Transition functions from 2006 to 2014
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Appendix 1: PSTR Estimation
The estimation of the PSTR model consists of several stages. In the first
step, a null hypothesis of linearity is tested against the alternative hypoth-
esis of a threshold specification. Then, if the linear specification is rejected,
the estimation of the parameters of the PSTR model requires eliminating
the individual effects, µi, by removing individual-specific means and then
applying nonlinear least squares to the transformed model.
In the Gonza´lez et al. (2005) procedure, testing linearity in a PSTR model
(equation 1) can be done by testing H0 : γ = 0 or H0 : β0 = β1. In both
cases, the test is non-standard, since the PSTR model contains unidentified
nuisance parameters underH0 (Davies (1987)). The solution is to replace the
transition function, g(qit; γ, c), with its first-order Taylor expansion around
γ = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis in an auxiliary regression. We
then obtain:
Sit = µi + θ0 Xit + θ1 Xitqit + ǫ
∗
it
. (3)
In these auxiliary regressions, parameter θ1 is proportional to the slope
parameter γ of the transition function. Thus, testing linearity against the
PSTR simply consists of testing H0 : θ1 = 0 in (3) for a logistic function
with the usual LM test. The corresponding LM statistic has an asymptotic
χ2(p) distribution under H0.
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Appendix 2: Endogenous drivers of nonlinearities
Table 7 Definition of Threshold variables
Variables Definition
Liquidity Spirals
AAA/ 10-year Bund spread
Spread between European corporate bonds rated Aaa and the
10-year German Bund. All corporate bond indices are Markit
i-boxx European corporate bonds
10-year Swap spread
Difference between the fixed rate component of swap and the
yield on a 10-year Treasury.
High-Yield bond/ Baa spread Spread between ”junk bonds” and Baa-rated corporate bonds
StockbondsCorr
Three-month rolling correlation between the domestic stock in-
dex of each country of our panel and the 10-year Bund index.
We use the negative values of the correlations.
Cross-Section dispersion banks
CAPM regression of the daily return on each bank’s stock index
against the daily return on the S&P Europe 350 index, using
data for the previous 12 months. The estimated coefficients are
then used to calculate the forecast errors of the current month.
Last we calculate the interquartile range for these residuals in
order to keep the central 50%. The lower the interquartile value,
the smaller the dispersion across banks. We use daily data on the
S&P Europe 350 and the stock prices of the 82 largest commer-
cial banks in terms of market value. The larger the cross-section
dispersion, the larger the information asymmetry.
Banking Sovereign Nexus
IVOL bank
Standard deviation of residual returns from a CAPM regression
using an aggregate European banking sector price index and
the S&P Europe 350. Equivalent of the VIX for the banking
industry.
Cmax Fi
Cmaxt = 1−
Pt
max[Pt−24...Pt]
with P the five domestic banking
stock indices. The more bearish the market, the closer to 1 the
indicator.
Euribor-OIS
The difference between the Euro Interbank Offered rate and the
overnight indexed swap rate. This indicator must be taken with
some caution because of the alleged manipulation of the Euribor
rate.
CDS Snr-Fin
Basket of 25 single CDS covering 25 senior subordination Euro-
pean banks
CDS Sub-Fin
Basket of 25 single CDS covering 25 junior subordination Euro-
pean banks
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Table 8 Threshold variables (cont.)
Control Variables Definition
I-traxx Europe Most liquid 125 CDS referencing European investment grade
credits
X-over Sub-investment grades names
Hivol Highest spread non-financial names from iTraxx Europe
Vstoxx European equivalent of the VIX
RVOL Germ
Realized volatility using the 10-year German government bond
index computed as the monthly average of absolute daily rate
changes
RVOL Nonfin Realized volatility of domestic non-financial sector stock market
indices
RVOL Pound Realized volatility of euro exchange rate against British pound
RVOL Doll Realized volatility of euro exchange rate against US Dollar
RVOL Yen Realized volatility of euro exchange rate against Japanese Yen
FTSE 300 Returns of the FTSE 300 stock market indices
S&P 350 Returns of the S&P 350 stock market index
Domestic indices returns
Matrix of the domestic stock returns indices of the five countries
in our panel (PSI, IBEX, ATHEX, FTSEMIB, ISEQ)
CISS
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress of the ECB which ag-
gregates five market-specific subindices (Hollo et al. 2012
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Appendix 3: Robustness
To check the robustness of our results, we proceed to alternative estimates:
r In the first sub-sample (including Italy, Spain and Portugal), over-
all amplification effects are confirmed when Cmax Fi is used as a
threshold variable in an alternative specification reported in Table 5.
In particular, these estimates confirm that fiscal imbalances are not
priced more severely in the crisis.
r Banking CDS and sovereign bonds may price the same information,
which would raise an endogeneity bias due to simultaneity. To address
this, we re-estimate our optimal model by lagging the threshold vari-
able. Linearity is strongly rejected (LM = 179.9), and amplification
effects are confirmed.
r Last, we check that our nonlinearity finding does not result from omit-
ting the financial CDS index as an explanatory variable so that a linear
regression would be enough.24 Our results are not affected by the intro-
duction of the financial CDS index in the vector of determinants (Xit
in Eq. 1), and its coefficient is not significant. That indicates that this
variable drives nonlinear effects in the sovereign bond pricing (LM=
216.8).
24 We thank the referee for this comment.
